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F I R S T

A M E N D M E N T

May a State Legislature Prohibit State
Political Subdivisions From Making
Payroll Deductions for Political Activities?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 113–116. © 2008 American Bar Association.

authorization by the employee. In
1995, the Act was amended to clarify that the Act applied to all
employment, private and public,
including employees of the state and
its political subdivisions.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
and the co-author of West’s Federal
Jury Practice and Instructions
(5th ed.). Prof. Grenig may be
reached at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.

The Act’s provision relating to payroll deductions remained unchanged
until 2003. In 2003, the Idaho legislature enacted the Voluntary
Contributions Act (VCA), a series of
amendments to Title 44 of the Idaho
Code, including an amendment to
Chapter 20 (Right to Work). The
Chapter 20 amendment states:
“Deductions for political activities
as defined in chapter 26, title 44,
Idaho Code, shall not be deducted
from the wages, earnings or compensation of an employee.” Idaho
Code § 44-2004(2). “Political activities” are defined as “electoral
activities, independent expenditures, or expenditures made to any
candidate, political party, political
action committee or political issues
committee or in support of or
against any ballot measure.” The
VCA also amended Idaho Code

ISSUE
Does the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibit
the Idaho legislature from removing
the authority of state political subdivisions to make payroll deductions
for political activities?

FACTS
More than twenty years ago, Idaho
adopted the Right to Work Act,
which declares a state policy that
“[t]he right to work shall not be
infringed or restricted in any way
based on membership in, affiliation
with, or financial support of a labor
organization or on refusal to join,
affiliate with, or financially or otherwise support a labor organization.”
The Right to Work Act prohibits any
requirement for the payment of
“dues, fees, assessments, or other
charges of any kind or amount to a
labor organization” as a condition of
employment. The Act expressly
authorizes employers to deduct
from employee compensation union
dues, fees, assessment or other
charges for payment to a labor organization if pursuant to a signed

(Continued on Page 114)

YSURSA V. POCATELLO EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION ET AL.
DOCKET NO. 07-869
ARGUMENT DATE:
NOVEMBER 3, 2008
FROM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT

113

Case
at a
Glance
In 2003 the Idaho
legislature prohibited all
Idaho public employers—
including political subdivisions such as counties,
municipalities, and
school districts—from
making payroll deductions for political activities to a political committee or other entity authorized to receive the contributions. The Supreme
Court is called upon to
determine whether the
prohibition as applies to
political subdivisions
violates the First
Amendment.

§ 67-6605, allowing political committees to “solicit or obtain contributions from individuals as provided
in chapter 26, title 44, Idaho Code,
or as provided in section 44-2004,
Idaho Code.”
Respondent Idaho Education
Association and other unions representing public employees filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of
the VCA, naming as defendants
Bannock County Prosecuting
Attorney Mark Heideman, Idaho
Attorney General Lawrence Wasden,
and Secretary of State Ben Ysursa.
The respondents sought declaratory
and injunctive relief from enforcement of Section 44-2004(2) as violative of their rights to free speech
and equal protection under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The petitioners conceded that several provisions of the VCA were
unconstitutional because they
restricted the ability of labor organizations to solicit political contributions. On cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to the
remaining substantive provision
banning payroll deductions for political activities, the district court held
that the payroll deduction prohibition violated the First Amendment
to the extent it applied to local government employers and private
employers. It also held, however,
that the payroll deduction ban could
be applied constitutionally to the
state’s own payroll system, i.e., to
employees of the State of Idaho.
Accordingly, the court granted in
part and denied in part both
motions. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v.
Heideman, 2005 WL 3241745 (D.
Idaho 2005). The secretary of state
and the attorney general appealed
the district court’s ruling that
Section 44-2004(2) is unconstitutional with respect to local government employers and school district
employers. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held

that Idaho, in enacting a statute
prohibiting local government
employers from allowing employees
to make payroll deductions for political activities was acting as a lawmaker with the power to regulate,
not as a proprietor managing the
state’s internal operations.
Accordingly, the court said the
statute was subject to strict scrutiny. The court held that Section 442004(2) burdens speech by diminishing the respondents’ ability to
conduct any of the activities defined
by the Idaho Code as “political.”
The court observed that the term
“political activities” is broadly
defined to include virtually all types
of electioneering, including “electoral activities” as well as spending
on behalf of or against candidates,
ballot measures, political action or
issue committees, or parties.
Acknowledging that the law does
not prohibit the respondents from
participating in political activities,
the court found the law hampers
their ability to do so by making the
collection of funds for that purpose
more difficult. The court also noted
that the law on its face prohibits
payroll deductions only for political
activities. According to the court,
this is subject-matter discrimination, which is a form of content
discrimination.
The court sustained the First
Amendment challenge to the payroll
deduction ban as applied to local
government employers, but ruled
that the statute could be applied to
the state’s own payroll system. The
court said the Idaho law banning
payroll deductions for political
activities, as applied to local government employers, was not rendered
invalid under the First Amendment
on the theory of government-subsidized speech. While the state subsidized its own payroll deduction system, and thus could properly forbid
payroll deductions of its own
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employees to be used for union
activities, the court explained that
the state did not subsidize the payroll deduction systems of local governments. Pocatello Education
Association v. Heideman, 504 F.3d
1053 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court granted the
petitioners’ request for review.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association, 128 S.Ct. 1762 (2008).

CASE ANALYSIS
The petitioners argue that the Ninth
Circuit strayed far afield from
accepted First Amendment “forum”
jurisprudence by incorporating a
proprietary-regulatory distinction.
According to the petitioners, that
distinction is not to be found, or
even remotely suggested, in the
Supreme Court’s forum-based decisions. In regulating public entities,
petitioners say the legislature
defines a political subdivision’s
authority and thereby affects a relationship committed to the states
themselves, and, under the circumstances here, not subject to federal
constitutional constraints. The petitioners argue that, in controlling
access to the relevant public
employer payroll systems, Idaho
political subdivisions must comply
with statutory constraints on their
authority. The petitioners declare
that nothing in the First
Amendment precludes a state legislature from requiring its own governmental creations to take an
action that, in the absence of such
requirement, the political subdivision could take without infringing
the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.
According to the petitioners, the
threshold inquiry is whether the
payroll systems of Idaho political
subdivisions are traditional public
forums, designated public forums, or
nonpublic forums. They say the
payroll systems clearly fall outside
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the category of traditional public
forums because their purpose is to
provide for the accurate accounting
and remittance of employee compensation. The petitioners also
assert the payroll systems are not
designated public forums for similar
reasons.
Contending the payroll system is a
nonpublic forum, the petitioners
argue access to a nonpublic forum
may be denied or limited on
grounds that are reasonable in light
of the forum’s purpose and are otherwise viewpoint neutral. They say
the Idaho statute satisfies the viewpoint-neutrality requirement insofar
as it imposes a categorical prohibition on the use of payroll deductions for any political activities.
According to the petitioners, the
Ninth Circuit’s use of the First
Amendment to vitiate state legislative control over political subdivisions cannot be reconciled with the
longstanding rule that the U.S.
Constitution ordinarily imposes no
limits on how state legislatures may
allocate powers and duties to political subdivisions. Absent manifest
congressional indication to the contrary, the petitioners declare there
is no restriction on state legislative
prerogative to delegate the state’s
authority to political subdivisions.
It is the petitioner’s position that
the court of appeals’ attempt to
interpose the First Amendment
between the Idaho legislature and
local government entities owing
their existence to legislative action
intrudes dramatically on the “science of government” that the
Constitution leaves to the states.
Under that approach, the petitioners
say the legislature would have no
alternative other than assuming pervasive control over all aspects of the
operation of a political subdivision’s
payroll system if it desired to regulate one discrete practice.
Asserting that the making of politi-

cal contributions and expenditures
constitutes speech for First
Amendment purposes, respondents
argue that Section 44-2004(2), as a
content-based restriction singling
out political speech, is presumptively invalid and subject to strict
scrutiny. Respondents argue that
Section 44-2004(2), like other provisions of the VCA, targets one kind
of political activity—union political
activity—for special disfavor.
The respondents claim the petitioners’ argument that Section 442004(2) should be reviewed only for
reasonableness is without merit.
Respondents say the reasonableness
test petitioners seek to invoke is
applicable only where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather
than acting as lawmaker with the
power to regulate or license. In such
a case, respondents explain that the
government simply declines to facilitate particular speech in its own
forum, but does not obstruct speech
that otherwise would take place in
another entity’s forum. When a government is acting in a proprietary
capacity with respect to a facility or
program, respondents assert it necessarily is in the business of deciding who will have access to the facility or program; it comes with the
territory that some of those decisions are likely to involve speech
activities.
When the government imposes a
speech restriction in its own forum
in the course of its ongoing management of that forum, reviewing the
action only for reasonableness comports with the principle that strict
scrutiny of content-based restrictions is not required in a limited
class of cases in which there is only
an inconsequential risk that the
government may be seeking to suppress ideas or viewpoints. According
to respondents, it would not com-

port with that principle to apply a
reasonableness standard—instead of
strict scrutiny—to a content restriction imposed by a state that has
reached out, in the capacity of lawmaker rather than proprietor, to
impose a speech restriction in
another entity’s forum.
Observing that local governments,
not the state, are the proprietors of
local government payroll deduction
systems, respondents say there has
been no current or previous exercise of control by the state over
local governments’ administration of
their payroll systems, except for the
subject statute. Consequently,
respondents assert there is no
escaping the fact that, in enacting
Section 44-2004(2) as applied to
local government employees, Idaho
was acting as a lawmaker, not a proprietor. Contrary to petitioners’ contentions, this Court has never
applied a reasonableness test to a
content-based speech restriction in
such circumstances.
According to the respondents, a
local government that plays no role
in advocating (much less in soliciting) the political contributions its
employees make, and simply permits an employee to use payroll
deductions as the means of making
any such contributions the employee may wish to make, just as the
employer would permit the employee to use payroll deductions for other kinds of payments, cannot fairly
be said to be entangling itself in
political activities. Respondents
state that payroll deduction systems
are the only kind of local government property or facility that the
Idaho legislature has declared off
limits in connection with political
activities. They note that local governments are free to allow employees—as well as managers and other
officials—to make use of every other
kind of local government property
(Continued on Page 116)
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or facility for political activities,
even where this would involve political partisanship such as is not
involved where an employer merely
grants employee requests to make
use of the payroll deduction system.

SIGNIFICANCE
The First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” The Fourteenth
Amendment renders that prohibition applicable to the states. This
case presents a controversy mixed
with First Amendment and federalism concerns.
The Supreme Court’s decision
would resolve inconsistent reasoning and rulings in four separate cases—in three different federal circuits and an Ohio appellate court—
concerning virtually identical state
statutes. Both the Ninth Circuit in
Pocatello Education Association
and the Tenth Circuit in Utah
Education Association v. Shurtleff,
512 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2008),
held a statutory prohibition of payroll deductions for political activities to be unconstitutional. The
Sixth Circuit in Toledo Area AFLCIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307
(6th Cir. 1998), has held a similar
statute to be constitutional. In a
state-court decision, the Ohio Court
of Appeals held a statute prohibiting
payroll deductions for political
activities was unconstitutional
because, “The prohibition on direct
partisan political expression by
labor organizations strikes at the
core of the electoral process and
constitutional freedom of speech.”
United Auto Workers Local Union
1112 v. Philomena, 700 N.E.2d 936,
954 (Ohio App. 1998).
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